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Abstract. Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) is a combination of different embedded subsystems, which work independently of each 
other and interact with the environment. Embedded systems operate in the presence of inherent uncertainty, context dependencies 
and adversarial certainty. In the physical world of embedded systems, all operational environments (Cyber, Physical) are 
adversarial whether by incident or by users, by natural adversaries or by combination of those. 
 
This research has identified the key area which is lack of trust and security among cyber physical systems, although there are 
many security approaches and methods which are available in order to secure CPS, unfortunately none of them emphasis the issue 
of trust based secure CPS. In order to achieve trust among Cyber Physical Systems, a two tier blanket approach for achieving the 
trust among Cyber Physical Systems has been proposed, which mainly consists of internal and external layers of trust. 
Keywords: Cyber Physical Systems, Trust, Security, SCADA, embedded systems 
1 Introduction 
The term "cyber-physical systems" refers to the tight conjoining of and coordination between computational and physical 
resources. This research foresees that the cyber-physical systems of tomorrow will far exceed those of today in terms of 
adaptability, autonomy, efficiency, functionality, reliability, safety, and usability. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), which are 
integrations of computational and physical processes, are becoming increasingly common in today’s society.  
Cyber-Physical System (CPS) is a network of hybrid (self-building) or, combination of physical entities and software systems 
that control them [1]. Cyber-physical systems are tight integration of computation, networking, and physical objects, in which 
embedded devices are networked to sense, monitor, and control the physical world. CPS bridges the virtual world of computing 
and communication and the real world [2]. 
The integration of computing and physical processes is not new. Cyber-physical systems exist today, but in a much smaller 
scale in size and complexity than the anticipated CPS of the future. The revolution will mainly come from massive networking of 
embedded computing devices such as sensors and actuators [13]. 
CPS has many applications in a wide variety of systems including medical systems, industrial monitoring, agriculture and 
avionics [3].A concept map of CPS is presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Cyber Physical Systems – A Concept Map (Adapted from [25] 
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In the last few years there is a tremendous increase in the number of various computers of everyday use. Modern computers are 
becoming smaller and smaller, while equipped with higher performance like computational speed and memory size, as stated by 
Moore’s law. As a consequence, computers are transforming into a lot of new forms. Some examples of new forms of computers 
include mobile phones, smart sensors, and even ordinary physical things, such as a lamp, a table and a cup [30]. 
In other words, many physical things will possess computing and communication capabilities at different levels, which are 
provided by small and (possibly) invisible computers embedded therein. This integration of networked computing and physical 
dynamics has led to the emergence of cyber-physical systems (CPS), which have become very popular in recent years [18] and this 
makes CPS distinct from other types of cyber / computational systems. 
Thoshitha T. Gamage, Bruce M. McMillin, Thomas P. Roth, [19], explain that numerous integration levels within modern 
systems can be broadly categorized into two domains: a cyber-infrastructure (computations, control algorithms, decision engines, 
databases, etc.) and a physical infrastructure (physical processes and components, links and connections, etc.). Commonly known 
as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), such systems are put together to provide better resource utilization, control, fault tolerance and 
performance. 
One prominent feature in CPSs is that embedded computers and communication networks govern both physical manifestations 
and computations. This, in turn, affects how the two primary infrastructures interact with each other, and the outside world. From a 
functionality point of view, a CPS can be regarded as the intersection of properly built individual (cyber, physical, network) 
components.  
This, unfortunately, is not the case in terms of security. Treating CPS security in a disjoint manner allows unintended 
information flow. Access-control-based methods and information-flow-based methods are the two primary approaches to system 
security policies and mechanisms. 
1.1 Trust and Security in CPS 
According to Siani Pearson and Azzedine Benameur [16], Trust is a complex concept for which there is no universally accepted 
scholarly definition. Evidence from a contemporary, cross-disciplinary collection of scholarly writing suggests that a widely held 
definition of trust is as follows [20]: “Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon 
positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”. Yet, this definition does not fully capture the dynamic and varied 
subtleties involved: trust is a complex notion and a multi-level analysis is important in order to try to understand it. There are many 
different ways in which online trust can be established: security may be one of these (although security, on its own, does not 
necessarily imply trust) [21]. Some would argue that security is not even a component of trust: Nissenbaum argues that the level of 
security does not affect trust [22]. On the other hand, an example of increasing security to increase trust comes from people being 
more willing to engage in e-commerce if they are assured that their credit card numbers and personal data are cryptographically 
protected [23].  
There can be differing phases in a relationship such as building trust, a stable trust relationship and declining trust. Trust can be 
lost quickly, as Nielsen states [24]: “It [trust] is hard to build and easy to lose: a single violation of trust can destroy years of slowly 
accumulated credibility”. 
The estimation and control algorithms used in CPS are designed to satisfy certain operational goals, such as, closed-loop 
stability, safety, liveness, or the optimization of a performance function. Intuitively, our security goal is to protect these operational 
goals from a malicious party attacking targeted cyber infrastructure [14]. 
In traditional security models, a security perimeter is setup to create a trust boundary within which there is self-control over 
computer resources and where sensitive information is stored and processed. Moreover [17], security and trust are two tightly 
interdependent concepts and because of this interdependence, these terms are used interchangeably when defining a secure system 
[34]. However, security is different from trust and the key difference is that, it is more complex and the overhead is high. 
 
Trust has been the focus of researchers for a long time [35], from the social sciences, where trust between humans has been 
studied, to the effects of trust in economic transactions [36-38]. Although intuitively easy to comprehend, the notion of trust has 
not been formally defined. Unlike, for example, reliability, which was originally a measure of how long a machine can be 
trustworthy, and came to be rigorously defined as a probability, trust is yet to adopt a formal definition. 
 
Understanding the notion of trust is the key to model trust properly in a specific discipline. Trust is an old but important issue in 
any networked environment; it has been there all the time and people have been using it in their daily life interactions without 
noticing, that is, buying and selling, communicating, cooperating, decision-making etc. involve some sort of trust without paying 
attention to it as a specific phenomenon. 
 
Security, however, also needs to deal with non-operational goals. For example, if the measurements collected by the sensor 
network contain sensitive private information, it must ensure that only authorized individuals can obtain these data. Since 
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components in Cyber Physical Systems are networked at every scale. The behavior of a Cyber Physical System is a fully-integrated 
hybridization of computational (logical), physical, and human action. 
2 Background and Literature Review 
Cyber Physical Systems have been growing for the last few years, and this is due to the advancement in technology more 
specifically in sensing, computing and networking, deeply embedded sensor and wireless sensors/actuator networks. 
Table 1 presents the literature review and analysis on the literature carried out on Cyber Physical Systems with their areas of 
focus.  
Table 1. Literature review and analysis  
Article Area of Focus Discussion 
[6] Jin Wang et al. Presented an introduction of cyber physical 
enhanced secured wireless sensor networks (WSNs) 
integrated cloud computing for u-life care architecture 
called (CPeSC3) architecture. Their proposed CPeSC3 
architecture is composed of three main components, 
namely communication core, computation core, and 
resource scheduling and management core. In security 
core, concatenation is applied between source sensor 
node and random number to provide protection 
against attacks and then encrypt them to provide 
anonymity of the source node against some attacks. 
 
 In this work authors describe 
how to enhance secure 
wireless sensors networks, 
and integrate it to cloud 
computing. 
 Security issues are up to 
certain level, but nothing 
related to trust in CPS. 
 [7] Michael 
Kirkpatrick et al. 
Proposed hardware-based lightweight, security 
technique for CPS. They have considered the use of 
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) to bind an 
access request to specific hardware with device-
specific keys. Their PUFs are implemented in 
hardware, such as SRAM, and can be used to uniquely 
identify the device. This technology could be used in 
CPS to ensure location based access control and 
encryption, both of which would be desirable for CPS 
implementations. However, PUFs are deterministic, as 
repeating the PUF, evaluation on the same hardware 
device will always produce the same value. Thus, 
PUFs can be used to confirm the unique identity of a 
hardware device. 
 
 In this work, they consider 
hardware-based techniques to 
enhance CPS device based 
performance, which is one of 
major area in CPS, but again 
no discussion or inclusion of 
component in CPS. 
[8] Guowei Wu et 
al. 
Proposed an access control scheme called fault-
tolerant emergency-aware access control (FEAC). 
Their control scheme provides a proactive and 
adaptive access control policies especially to address 
multiple emergencies management problem and 
supposes the fault-tolerant scheme for CPS 
applications. They have introduced Priority and 
Dependency-Action Generation Model (PD-AGM) to 
select the optimal response action path for eliminating 
all the active emergencies within the system. The 
priority and dependency relationships of emergencies 
are used to exclude the infeasible response action 
paths and relieve the emergencies combination state 
explosion problem.  
 
 In this work, authors have 
discussed issues related to 
proactive and adaptive access 
control policies based on the 
integration of hardware and 
software based. 
 Moreover issues raised will 
work up to certain levels, lack 
of major security issues and 
no discussion related to Trust 
based CPS. 
[9] Christopher Developed three novel software methodologies to  In this work the researcher 
4 
 
Zimmer et al. provide enhanced security in deeply embedded real-
time systems. They have attained elevated security 
assurance through two levels of instrumentation that 
enable us to detect anomalies, such as timing dilations 
exceeding WCET bounds. The three software 
methodologies that they have used are T-Rex, T-ProT 
and T-AxT. These methodologies detect more 
intrusions that harm security in CPS. 
concentrates on software 
based techniques to enhance 
security in real-time 
embedded systems. 
 No issues related to Trust 
based security is discussed. 
[10] Quanyan Zhu 
et al.  
Proposed 6-layer security architecture for cyber 
physical systems motivated by the OSI and PRM 
models. First, they have addressed the security issues 
present at each layer and pinpointed a holistic 
viewpoint for security solutions in CPS. They have 
also proposed a game-theoretical model that builds 
bottom up from the physical layer and argued that the 
saddle-point solution to the dynamic game gives rise 
to a cross layer security policy. 
 Layer based security approach 
has developed, which ensures 
security at each layer, with in 
the system, but nothing is 
suggested or discussed related 
to Trust. 
[11] Nayot 
Poolsappasit et al.  
Proposed a method for security risk assessment called 
Bayesian Attack Graphs (BAGs). Their model 
incorporates the usual cause consequence 
relationships between different network states (as in 
attack graphs and attack trees) and, in addition, takes 
into account the likelihood of exploiting such 
relationships. They proposed a method to estimate an 
organization’s security risk from different 
vulnerability exploitations based on the metrics 
defined in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
(CVSS). Finally, they modeled the risk mitigation 
stage as a discrete reasoning problem and used genetic 
algorithm to solve it. The algorithm can identify 
optimal mitigation plans in the context of both single 
and multi-objective analysis. 
 In this research the authors 
concentrate on vulnerabilities 
and likelihood of exploitation 
of these vulnerabilities using 
Bayesian attack graph. 
 No such issues related to 
Trust have been discussed or 
highlighted. 
[12] Teodor 
Sommestad et al.  
Described a framework for assessing the security of 
information systems while considering uncertainty. 
They presented on a model based assessment 
framework for analyzing the cyber security provided 
by different architectural scenarios. Their framework 
uses the Bayesian statistics based Extended Influence 
Diagrams to express attack graphs and related 
countermeasures. The approach allows calculating the 
probability that attacks will succeed and the expected 
loss of these given the instantiated architectural 
scenario. Moreover, the framework can handle the 
uncertainties that are accompanied to the analyses. 
Their model can be merged with architecture Meta 
models by using a concept called Abstract models. 
 Model based assessment 
Security framework has been 
designed which is basically 
applied on different 
architectural scenarios, again 
lack of Trust based security.  
 
Based on literature review and analysis, this research supports the initial findings that most of the studies target specific domain 
in CPS, while lacking the trust and security issues which are considered vital today and in future. Major characteristics of Trust are 
reliability, safety, security, privacy and usability. 
In CPS, security should be considered as part of the CPS architecture and application development other than just applying 
security solutions [4]. The security issues are crucial for CPS applications because the entities within the systems not only interact 
with each other, but also with the physical environment, thus the security issues must be addressed [8].  
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2.1 Attacks in CPS: 
Securing the emerging internet and information-rich CPSs is difficult because a number of cyber-security attacks. Some of the 
common attacks in CPS are described below, [5]. 
Eavesdropping  
Eavesdropping refers to the attack that adversary can intercept data and any information communicated by the system. CPS is 
particularly susceptible to eavesdropping through traffic analysis such as intercepting the monitoring data transferred in sensor 
networks collected through monitoring. Eavesdropping also violates the user’s privacy such as a patient’s personal health status 
data transferred to the system. 
Compromised-Key Attack  
An attacker can gain access to a secured communication without the perception of the sender or the receiver by using the 
compromised key. The attacker can decrypt or modify data by the compromising key, and try to use the compromised key to 
compute additional keys, which could allow the attacker to access other secured communications or resources. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attack  
In man-in-the-middle attack, false messages are sent to the operator, and can take the form of false negative or false positive 
messages. This may cause the operator to take an action, such as flipping a breaker, when it is not required, or it may cause the 
operator to think everything is fine and not take action when an action is required. 
Denial-of-Service Attack  
This type of attack prevents the legitimate traffics or requests for network resources from being processed or responded by the 
system. The denial-of-service attack prevents normal work or use of the system. After gaining access to the network of cyber 
physical systems, the attacker can always do any of the following,  
 Flood a controller or the entire sensor network with traffic until a shutdown occurs due to the overload. 
 
 Send invalid data to controller or system networks, which causes abnormal termination or behavior of the services. 
 
 Block traffic, which results in a loss of access to network resources by authorized elements in the system. 
 
Another new type of attack, in which an attacker might be able to launch to control systems (i.e., attacks which are not possible 
in traditional IT systems), one of them is: 
Resonance attacks  
The attacker that has compromised some sensors or controllers will force the physical system to oscillate or change at its 
resonant frequency [21]. 
Jamming the communication attack  
In [26], researchers assess the security of Cyber Physical Systems through experimental evaluation of two different components 
in target tracking applications; in the first component they assess the impact of low level jamming attacks on convergence 
properties in different target tracking scenarios. In the second component they assess the intelligent jamming attack technique in 
which an attacker aims to increase his/her reward based on various jamming attack policies and actions. 
Integrity attack 
In this type of attack in CPS, an attacker wishes to disturb the system by injecting external control inputs and fake sensor 
measurements [27].  
3 Threats/uncertainties and protection of Assets in Cyber Physical Systems 
Like any other system, security is a key challenge for the deployment of CPS. CPS needs protection from threats which in turn 
utilize the vulnerability and cause damage to CPS. 
Referring to standard GB/T20984 [20], information systems assets can be classified into the following six classes: data, 
software, hardware, service, people, and other assets. Threats can be classified into hardware and software breakdowns, miss 
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operation, physical environment influences, management problems, malicious code, ultra vires, cyber-attacks, physical attacks, 
breach of confidence , falsification, repudiation and vulnerabilities are as follows: physical damages, network vulnerabilities, 
operating systems vulnerabilities, problems in technique and organization management, application middleware vulnerabilities, 
application systems vulnerabilities , and management problems. 
The indicators mentioned above are very general which can be more detailed and further divided into sub indicators. For 
information security assessment, indicators can be selected according to the security goal of unique information system. 
Alvaro A, Saurabh Amin, Bruno Sinopoli and Annarita Giani [20], highlight the key challenges for securing Cyber Physical 
Systems which are: 
1. Understanding the threats, and possible consequences of attacks. 
2. Identifying the unique properties of Cyber Physical Systems and their differences from traditional IT security. 
3. Discussing security mechanisms applicable to cyber physical systems. 
 
On the other hand, in order to understand the new classes of threats in Cyber Physical Systems such as the smart grid and 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems), it is useful to characterize the interactions based on the domain that 
is the origin of threat, and the domain where the impact is felt [21]. 
Cyber threats include those into confidentiality or integrity of data in the system, including connecting to a device on a home 
area network and retrieving usage data or modifying billing information etc. One major characteristic of the cyber threats is that 
they are scalable, i.e. they are easily automated and replicated and one should expect them to propagate freely across untrusted 
domains. Cyber physical threats are those that originate within the cyber domain but which have an impact on the physical 
characteristics of a system. 
Today’s Cyber Physical Systems require a tight knit information and communication capability, because of the vulnerability of 
the internet communications, protecting the system will require new technology to enhance security of power system command, 
control and communication [22].  
4 Need for trust-based secure CPS 
Today Cyber Physical Systems are an emerging and growing category of systems that combine the physical systems with the 
computational in a holistic way [23]. The key property of these systems is that functionality and salient system properties are 
emerging from an intensive interaction of physical and computational components, as the computational components are aware of 
their physical context, they are intrinsically distributed in time synchronizing, have to cope with uncertainty of sensoric-input and 
need to produce real-time interactions. 
CPSs are often designed as networks of interacting elements which are not limited to: Automotive systems, medical monitoring, 
process control systems (Smart Grid), SCADA and distributed robotics. 
Due to this integrations of CPS (Cyber and Physical components), which work collaboratively as embedded systems, there are 
many challenges between these two (Cyber and Physical) domains, forming trust and security is one major challenge. 
Currently, there are no defined procedures to evolve Cyber Physical Systems with respect to Trust based Security, threats to 
CPS, asset identification etc., there is dire need for such procedures. 
The increasing complexity of components and the use of more advanced technologies for sensors and actuators, wireless 
communication and multicore processes pose a major challenge in building CPS.  
In this research we have identified the main problem which is: to establish trust in relation to security among Cyber Physical 
Systems. 
Sub-Problem 1: 
Evaluate and analyze the existing security mechanisms in Cyber Physical Systems in comparison with trust based CPS. 
Sub-Problem 2: 
Evaluate and asses the role of Trust and Security in SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems) and within 
Smart Grids and to develop a comprehensive understanding of the security vulnerabilities in SCADA systems 
Sub-Problem 3: 
Evaluate systems availability and scalability, since cyber and physical components depend on each other and some of the CPS 
are very large (such as nationwide power grids). 
4.1 Significance: 
Cyber Physical Systems can be applied in a wide range of domains. Potential applications of CPS include assisted living, 
integrated medical systems, safe and efficient transportation, automated traffic control, advanced automotive systems, autonomous 
search and rescue, energy conservation, energy efficient buildings, environmental control, factory automation, home automation, 
critical infrastructure control, distributed autonomous robotics, defense, and so on. Ubiquitous applications and services that could 
significantly improve the quality of our daily lives will be enabled by CPS, which will make applications more effective [2]. 
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5 Trust-based secure cyber physical systems approach 
To create trust based secure cyber physical systems, we are proposing two tier trust oriented approach, this trust approach is 
further classified into:  
 
Internal Trust: responsible for different internal trusted entities such as sensors, actuators, communication networks 
 
External Trust, responsible for physical environment or architecture of cyber physical systems 
 
Trust levels can vary within a system depending on the specific functions on the time, context, and dynamically changing 
circumstances of its use. Achieving a trust in CPS is very tiresome and challenging; in our approach we create a boundary of trust 
internally and externally around CPS as depicted in Figure 2. 
Integration of these two levels of trust will be achieved by implementing a two tier blanket approach; where this blanket covers 
the whole CPS and hide it from outside world. We need to further investigate about how these two trusts can be defined and 
achieved; their integration and coordination issues among them will be further analyzed. 
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Fig. 2. Trust based secure CPS approach 
 
Cyber Physical Systems are different from desktop computing, traditional embedded /real-time systems and today’s wireless 
sensor networks and they have some defining characteristics.  
A CPS is envisioned to be a heterogeneous system of systems, which consists of computing devices and embedded systems 
including distributed sensors and actuators. These components are interconnected together in a large-scale and execute autonomous 
tasks to link the cyber world and the physical world [28]. 
 
Following are the main components of our proposed trust based CPS approach and their roles:  
 Physical System:  Collection of actuator units 
 Sensors and actuators: which are used to monitor and measure various physical processes. Sensors and actuators provide the 
interface between the physical and cyber worlds. A sensor is a device that measures a physical phenomenon, e.g., room 
temperature and converts physical phenomena into information which contains the attributes, sampling, timestamp and/or space 
stamp. An actuator on the other hand, is a device that is able to change attributes of a physical object, e.g., move a chair or 
physical phenomena [29]. 
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 Communication Network (wired / wireless): Communication network provides the connection between Cyber and physical 
systems through wired or wireless network. 
 Cyber System: Collection of control logic, sensor units and critical infrastructures. 
 Internal Trust: Trust state among physical systems, sensors and actuators and internal communication networks. 
 External Trust: Trust state among internal trust and external entities. 
 Boundary: Parameterized boundary where trust will be established. 
 Attacks: All kinds of external attacks on CPS. 
Trust is an important concept with respect to security. Trust is a belief that an entity will behave in a predictable manner in 
specified circumstances. The entity may be a person, process, object or any combination of such components, Trust is like bonding 
a relationship among cyber and physical components. 
Establishing a trust among internal and external components in any cyber physical system, i.e, (power grids, SCADA, Oil and 
Gas fields, aviation, water distribution and healthcare) is challenging due to the growing concern over cyber-attacks targeted 
towards these infrastructures. One major limitation of today’s cyber physical systems: is no established threat model to 
characterize the security needs and the level of acceptable risks. 
Trust Management and Attribution [29]: The cyber infrastructure in power system domain can be viewed as interconnected, 
“islands of automation’. This interconnection brings about inherent trust concerns as vulnerabilities in other domains may abuse 
trust relationship. In addition, if an organization has a system affected by a security event, than that information may not be 
communicated to all concerned domains, therefore the decreased trust is not appropriately communicated to all other systems. 
 Trust Management Lifecycle: The dynamic environment of the smart grid requires a trust model, which allows continual 
reevaluation. Since the smart grid will likely exhibit emergent behaviors, trust management must remain flexible to 
address continual modifications in usage and misuse patterns. Trust management policies should follow specific tailoring 
of these changes. 
 Formal Trust Representation: Investigate quantified notions of trust, specifically representing impact to control and 
privacy data. Develop algorithms to evaluate a trust revision impact on grid reliability. 
 Insider Threat Management: While most cyber protections attempt to limit external attacks, recent events have increased 
concerns from malicious insiders. Utility employees are typically highly trusted to efficiently manage and operate the 
grid; however, nefarious actions by these individuals could produce disastrous results. 
 Attribution: The ability to attribute actions back to a system or user is imperative to identify malicious actors. By 
developing strong attribution mechanisms, the individuals responsible for a cyber-attack can be identified and penalized. 
Additionally attribution provides a method to deter future malicious activities. 
In addition to the above we have identified the following issues which are not limited but could highly influence establishing trust 
among CPS components:  
 Technical implications 
 Practical implications 
 Management implications 
 Access control to vendors 
 Standardization: (up to what extent) 
 Vender influence  
 Weakest link (people working for particular organization) 
Nowadays Information and Communication Technology (ICT) services are becoming increasingly dependent upon CPS to 
provide automated and efficient management of essential services; care has to be taken to ensure that they are secured. 
According to Eric Ke Wang [5], a highly confident cyber physical system should satisfy the following objectives, while we 
consider “Trust” is another important objective.  
 
Confidentiality: 
 
Confidentiality refers to the capability to prevent the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals or systems. 
Confidentiality is necessary to maintain the users’ privacy in Cyber Physical Systems. Realizing Confidentiality in CPS must 
prevent an adversary from inferring the state of the physical system by eavesdropping on the communication channels between the 
sensors and the controller, as well as between the controller and the actuator. 
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Integrity:  
 
Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of data or resources that cannot be modified without authorization. Integrity in CPS could 
be the capability to achieve the physical goals by preventing, detecting, or blocking deception attacks on the information sent and 
received by the sensors and the actuators or controllers. A lack of integrity results in deception. 
Availability:  
 
For any system to serve its purpose, the service must be available when it is needed. High availability of CPS aims to provide 
service by preventing computing, controls, communication corruptions due to hardware failures, system upgrades, power outages 
or denial-of-service attacks. 
Authenticity:  
 
In computing and communication process it is necessary to ensure that the data, transactions, communications are genuine. It is 
also important for authenticity to validate that both parties involved are who they claim to be. In CPS, the authenticity aims to 
realize authentication in all the related processes such as sensing, communications, actuations.   
Trust Oriented:  
According to Blaze, M., Feigenbaum [15], Trust is context-dependent (the trust relationships are only meaningful in the specific 
contexts), dynamic, non-monotonic and function of uncertainty. 
 
Types of Trust: 
 Interpersonal (agent & context specific) 
 Structural (system within which trust exists)  
 Dispositional (independent of agent & context) 
Trust as an essential attribute in building a relationship between entities has been studied for a long time by scientists from 
disparate scientific fields. Every field has examined modeling and calculating trust using different techniques, and one of the most 
prominent and promising technique is the use of statistics, mainly probabilities to solve the problem, especially in dynamic 
networks where the topology is changing rapidly. 
The nature of CPS is integrated and embedded (sensors, actuators, communication network). However, to achieve Trust based 
CPS in distributed environments, such components should have a common vocabulary to allow them to communicate with each 
other regarding security attacks and countermeasures in a trusted way. For that purpose, we would like to employ two tier blanket 
approach that allows sharing a common understanding of information about information security (security attacks and trust, in 
particular) among both humans and software agents. 
6 Conclusion 
In order to achieve secure cyber-physical systems, it is required to incorporate trust factor into account at the very start of the 
design process for such systems. CPS is opening up extraordinary opportunities for research and development in numerous 
disciplines. Our research findings highlighted the key area of lacking trust in securing cyber physical systems. This blend of trust 
with CPS to achieve security is still unsolved and challenging. We presented two tier trust based blanket approach to achieve 
security in CPS. 
 This research will be further extended to implement trust based approach to find out how much we succeeded in securing CPS. 
This research will also analyze the existing security mechanisms in cyber physical systems in comparison with trust based CPS. 
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1 Introduction
Model driven development is a popular and promising approach for improv-
ing quality and eciency in the design and construction of embedded systems.
When we come to systems of systems, however, it quickly becomes obvious that
a whole system cannot be put into one single model. Systems of systems re-
quire systems of models. Furthermore, dierent domains, that are involved in
an integral view of a system, need their own models. Each domain has its own
dedicated languages and tools, where the phenomena and characteristics of the
domain can be expressed and analyzed in a suitable way. When models do not
have a common mathematical basis, as it is for continuous time and discrete
event perspectives, the need for multi-domain models is especially urgent.
Having models in dierent domains describing dierent aspects of one sys-
tem, a number of question has to be answered. One is, how these models or their
results can be coupled or integrated. Another is, how independent are these mod-
els? What does a modeller in one domain has to know about models of another
domain, when both describing parts of a systems of systems? We investigate this
question in the context of a framework, where a continuous time model and dis-
crete event model are coupled by co-simulation, as performed in the DESTECS
project [2]. We will approach the problem using an example of a small robot.
In this context, we focus on the question what a software modeller has to know
about the continuous time domain and the modeling decisions taken there.
A basic claim in our work is that modelling is not a purely formal process.
What abstractions to take, what the system fragment to model, what behaviour
to describe, e.g., are decisions that are taken in a non-formal way. However, these
decisions are based on both, structured arguments and experience. In earlier work
we investigated the question what decisions have to be taken while modelling. A
taxonomy of modelling decisions [10] can help to identify and acquire the relevant
knowledge about a system and its environment for the modelling process.
In multi-domain modelling, as we consider it in this work, the relevant knowl-
edge extends by additional restrictions caused by modelling decisions taken in
another model and specics of the other model domain. For continuous time
models and discrete event models one part of an answer is rather generic, and
can be found in the literature, as,. e.g. sampling time, taking into account jitter
and delays and mapping control architecture to software architecture. The non-
generic, and therefore more dicult part of the answer is, where a real plant
has to be addressed, and detailed knowledge about its specic mechanics and
electronics become relevant. We try to identify categories of modelling decisions
to take in this context of multi-domain models. Goal is that the explicit state-
ment of decision categories helps the modeller to guide the modelling process, to
identify the necessary decisions to take, and to improve the quality of the mod-
els constructed. Furthermore, we claim that by making modelling steps explicit,
also the re-use of models is supported and the modelling process becomes more
ecient.
2 Introduction to our Working Example
Before we proceed with our analysis of the modelling process, we will introduce
our running example and quickly describe the Destecs multi-domain modelling
framework.
DESTECS (Design Support and Tooling for Embedded Control Software) [2]
is a consortium of companies and research groups founded with the goal to
develop a tool and a method that supports concurrent modelling for simulation
of embedded systems. The idea of this approach is to couple the models made
by control and software engineers from early design stages. Control and software
engineers design their own models, using their mathematical formalisms and
tools, but within a joint framework that forces them to dene what are the
variables and parameters shared with the other model [5][4]. The advantage of
this approach is that it lets both groups of experts work in their domain, in
which mature methods and tools exist and which are well known to experts. At
the same time it forces them to communicate early in the design process and
identify the tradeos between dierent system requirements. This shortens the
integration time, in comparison when these two aspects are designed in isolation.
The DESTECS approach also pays a special attention to modelling faults and
fault-tolerance mechanisms, as they also pose requirements on both control and
software.
Control engineering is concerned with dynamical system behaviour. 'Dy-
namical' means that the behaviour over time is relevant, it implies long-term
qualitative properties of the system behaviour. For example, the system desired
behaviour is formulated in form of specications for dynamical behaviour of tem-
perature, pressure, position, speed of the plant components and processes. An
idealised design process steps could be described as a sequence of the follow-
ing tasks: (1) Model the plant, (2) Design the control law, (3) Simulate to test
whether the control forces the plant to behave as required.
The plant model is based on the laws of physics, it is a transfer function that
describes the dependence between the plant output (controlled) signal and the
plant input signal generated by the controller. The plant is belongs to continuous
domain, and the control is in discrete domain. Digital control theory is based
in the mathematical framework that supports design and analysis of a digital
control system that forces the continuous plant to perform required dynamical
behaviour. In the project, 20-sim [1] tool is used to model the plant, describe its
control laws and simulate it.
On the discrete event side, the VDM (Vienna Development Method) tool [3]
is used to model the software. VDM describes the software on an abstraction
level higher than that of the implementation. This allows the designer to model
the software specication and analyse the software in early design phases, be-
fore goind into the details of implemenation. The modern versions of VDM are
object-oriented languages that also support modelling or real-time aspects, such
as the schedulling policy of the underlying operating system and distribution to
dierent processors. VDM is a formal language, with formal semantics, there-
fore software properties can be formally checked. Integrity properties, which are
formal property descriptions can be generated automatically using VDMtools.
Also, ti si possible to enable test coverage documentation, using testing tech-
niques. The third way to validate the model is to execute models together with
the code, using the tool's graphical end.
2.1 Line-Following Robot
The example that we will use is the project's pilot study of modelling a line
following robot. The robot is a small cart with two wheels, each moved by a
servo motor. Also, each wheel is connected to an encoder that senses the wheel's
angular position. At the robot's front there are two infrared sensors that sense
the lightness on the oor based on infrared reection. Also, two infrared distance
sensors mounted on the robot sense objects based on reected infrared light. A
contact switch detects bumping to another object or a wall. The requirement
for the robot is to follow a black line drawn on the ground, using two infrared
sensors.
As it is the case in a pilot study, dierent models were designed, with dierent
software and controller arhitecture, and while this was done, the control and
software experts learnt from each other about the other domain.
The high-level model structure is shown on Fig. 2. This is just a high-level
diagram, with many details abstracted away as they are not relevant for our
discussion. For example, the loop control does not actually show the feedback
loop, and the tool does not directly connect the contract with the two models,
but they are equipped with interfaces towards the contract. Also, the DE control
architecture is not given in our diagram, but will be discussed later.
The plant is modelled using domain-independent bond graphs, the environ-
ment of the robot, which is the ground with a black line is described with the
le that contains the lines coordinates. The loop control is distributed to two
processors, each controlling one motor. It is a PID control, with a standard con-
trol structure, which usually asks for tuning its parameters in simulation and by
doing experiments.
The control that sends referent values to the wheels, that switches between
control modes, is in the DE side. Also, the part of the control that deals with
dierent faults is on the DE side.
The contract contains parameter and variables that are read by one of the
models an written into by the other. The parameters shared in this particular
case are the lateral and longitudinal oset of the robot. The variables that are
shared are the values of encoders, which the CT side writes into, and the DE
side reads. Another set of values read by the DE side, are the values of infra-red
sensors. The DE side writes into the variables that set the referent speeds for the
right and the left wheel (in case of a curvy path, the wheels will have dierent
speeds).
The contract also gets the information about the faults detected from CT
side, and the value of LED diodes is written by DE side, so that the operator
gets the signal if there is a fault and when the robot is in regular working mode.
ContractPlant model Loop control
Sequence, supervisory, 
and safety controller
CT model DE model
Fig. 1. High level diagram of a co-model.
With the Destecs tool, the models of the plant and the control are designed,
simultaneously with the software models and it is possible to simulate (and
visualise) the robot movement along a previously dened line.
2.2 Communication between Experts
The information that the two models share in direct interaction is made explicit
by the contract. In case of the robot, CT model will write encoder values, and
the DE model will read them. The DE model will set the referent speed values
that will be read by the CT model and forwarded to the PID controllers.
But, the communication between software and control (CT and DE) experts
contains much more. It is necessary that the two co-modellers communicate ??.
An example of the information that was necessary to exchange between the
experts is dierent interpretation of the angle direction - CT side used anti-clock
wise direction for positive angle, while the DE side used the clock-wise direction.
This reects some of the implicit assumptions hidden in an engineering discipline
culture.
At the moment, it is being investigated how to improve the contract to achieve
consistency between the models and whether more detailed documentation would
help in this communication. This is especially important when the two teams
are working in geographically isolated locations.
3 A Non-Formal Framework for Communicating
Modelling Decisions of CT and DE Modellers
The goal of our work is to give a non-formal framework for communicating mod-
elling decisions for CT and DE models, to uncover hidden assumptions made by
one modeller about the other model. Perhaps, there are sources of inconsisten-
cies between the two models that can be formalised, by designing an ontology,
like for example in the work of Lickly et ak. [7], or a meta-model, as done in the
work of Lee et al. [6].
But, before formalising, it is important to investigate what needs to be com-
pared and what are in general sources of conicts between these two models.
In our previous work, we explored the ways to deal with non-formal aspects
of modelling decisions. Modelling is only partially formal activity, as there are
a number of decisions that cannot be formalised and made part of a tool or a
general-purpose language. To structure these decisions, we developed a taxonomy
and used it to analyse modelling decisions a posteriori, to come up with guidelines
to develop next system generation [8]. We also used the taxonomy to structure
validation of the model that raises the condence of the modeller and the model
stakeholders that the model adequately represents the system with respect to
the requirements [9].
Our previous experience in analysing and designing models of two industrial
systems showed that the general categories of our taxonomy are useful only when
they are rened into problem-specic modelling steps. These steps are rened to
suit the problem in hand, but general enough to be reused in similar products,
like in case of product lines of product generations.
IFor a modelling process a number of issues are relevant: eciency, under-
standability, repeatability, and the competence of the resulting model. In the
context here, we look closer at the model competence, and nd that consistency
is a closely related concept. Possible inconsistency is an issue for any set of
submodels. When submodels are in dierent domains the possibilities for for-
malisation of inconsistencies get even less. Within the DESTECS project we
investigate the question how to achieve competence and how to avoid inconsis-
tencies of the two co-models. Our approach is to look at the modelling decisions
made by control and software engineers from the perspective of our taxonomy.
Competence is about a model representing the system correctly, with respect
to the requirements of the system for which the model is investigated (sometimes
these are referred to as a purpose of the model). Competence is a relationship
between a model and the system that the model represents, whereas consistency
is the relationship between the models. For example, models in the two domains
may be constructed with the same wrong assumption. They may be consistent
under this shared wrong assumption, but the composition does not lead to an
competent model of the system. Also, two models may be inconsistent even
though each of them, analysed in isolation, is competent. This might happen
when two models are designed to show dierent properties of a system, e.g.
one is made for showing stability when slowing down, the other one to show
that a robot can follow a straight line. Possible inconsistency is an issue for any
set of submodels. When submodels are in dierent domains the possibilities for
formalisation of inconsistencies get even less.
Both inconsistency and incompetence of submodels can lead to incompe-
tent co-models, where the reason is lack of knowledge about the other domain
(model).
consistency
M2M1
adequacy
System
Fig. 2. Distinguishing model's adequacy and consistency.
3.1 Classes of incompetence and inconsistency
Below we give a list of sources of inconsistency and incompetence. From a logical
perspective it is easier to describe when a model is inconsistent (or incompetent),
than when it is consistent (competent): the number of reasons for a model to
be inconsistent (incompetent) is huge. We cannot assume that we cover all of
them, but a model is only consistent (competent) if it avoids all possibilities of
inconsistency (incompetence).
Ideally, we would like to have all sources of inconsistencies and incompetences
to be automatically detected by a tool. Unfortunately, this is not possible in
general. Some can be found by a tool straightforwardly (syntax check), for some
we could add information to make them automatically detectable, as, e.g., by
extended types. Still a major part cannot be automatically treated. For these
we suggest to use the list below as guidelines, in the sense that if we address
issues listed there explicitly, we decrease the chance of getting inconsistent and
incompetent models.
Incompetence and inconsistencies can be introduced in initial models or dur-
ing the evolution of models. As this does not make a principle dierence for the
sort of incompetence and inconsistencies, we do not distinguish these two phases
in our analysis.
Contract level syntactic inconsistency:
A co-model is syntactically inconsistent if both models do not address the same
set of variables, parameters and events, with identier names, types and ranges.
Contract level semantic inconsistency:
If the variables, parameters and events do not address the same phenomena in
both models, the co-model will be inconsistent, e.g. a variable that represents
speed of a wheel is interpreted dierently in the sub-models. In the motion sys-
tems and autonomous vehichles, it is very important to always interpret correctly
spatial information. Studying the documentation of the robot case, we found that
the two groups of experts interpret dierently the angle values, the CT mod-
eler assigned the positive angle in the anti-clock wise direction, whereas the DE
modeller assumed that the angle goes up in the clock-wise direction. Therefore,
for these kinds of systems it should be established beforehand a referent system
and the initial robot position and orientation in this referent system.
In the robot two encoders are connected to the right and the left wheel, and
it is important that their connected with the correct connectors of the interface
card, which is a piece of hardware used to connect the encoder and the CPU.
Otherwise their identities can be mixed (the left wheel can be read as the right
while and vice versa). In the robot case, there are only two wheels to control, but
in the systems where many units of the same kind (e.g. beds in hospital connected
to a central computer that monitors patients) can be easily accidentally wired
wrongly.
Also if the measurement units do not coincide, models are inconsistent.
Variable propagation inconsistency:
It might be the case that at the interface/contract variables are interpreted
consistently, but , e.g., while passing them to other components of the control
software, the semantic interpretation of the variable changes, leading to incon-
sistency.
In the robot model, we noticed that the DE model reads the variables values
and then distributes these values from one variable to another. In copying the
value from variable 'a' to variable 'b', and then copying the value of the variable
'b' to variable 'c' and so on, it is extremely important to keep in mind what this
value represents. Theoretically, it could happen that the encoder value is copied
into the variable that represents the speed or the variable that represents the
value of a dierent encoder. In case of robot, if it would follow a straight line,
this would not be easily noticed, as the two wheels will always have the same
speed.
Initialisation phase inconsistency:
For the initial phase of a simulation run (and also a real system execution) as-
sumptions are made on the initial values of variables, about start-up procedures
(e.g. a control may assume that a robot starts up with the robot head in zero-
position. In reality the position of the robot-head is where it was at the end of
the last robot operation. Finding out the real position of the head may be part
of a start-up procedure that is called homing), and the availability of values in
buers.
Mode change incompetence:
A plant may operate in dierent modes, e.g. line following mode and turning
mode for a robot. When changing modes we also have assumptions on variable
values for the new mode starting. In a generalized view, this may also be consid-
ered as an initialisation phase inconsistency, but we want to distinguish it here
for explicitness.
Usually there is a start up mode, during which the plant moves to stationary,
working state; then there is the working mode that also can consist of dierent
modes; naly, shut-down mode puts the vehicle into a safe position.
Control theory assumes linear systems within of a mode, but the switch from
one mode to another can potentially be non-linear, which may bring unwaned
behaviour. The physical bahaviour of a plant is possibly not in a steady state
immediately after mode change, but needs a time to achieve a steady state. In
control engineering we speak "bumpless transfer" when these transition phases
are properly addressed. An example is the robot in the line following mode, that
will need some time to reach the intended speed. This is a common phenomenon
occuring in practical control design. If it is not addressed, it will lead to in-
competent models. If only addressed in the plant model, and not in the control
model, we will have inconsistent submodels.
An example of the transfer between modes may mean unwanted sudden
changes of currents and voltages, but it can also have consequences in not con-
trolling the plant parts. For example, a vehicle similar to our robot was designed
to carry packages along a partly inclined surface. Two dierent control modes
were used to control the vehicle, and as the vehicle climb with a high speed,
the packages bounced o it, when it reached the horizontal surface. The bounc-
ing was an uncontrolled phenomena, left there as it did not pose any danger.
But, these 'in-between' modes behaviours need to be carefully examined, and
sometimes control has to change to avoid unwanted or unpredictable behaviour.
Sampling time incompetence:
Control theory states that for the discrete control of a continuous plant a certain
sampling period is necessary to ensure that the plant behaves as intended. The
sampling time depends in the rst place on the dynamical plant behaviour and
the physical properties of the plant. As there is an innite set of possible dynamic
plant behaviours, the requirements determine the ones of interest. If the correct
sampling time is not considered in the control model, the overall model is not
competent.
Computation time incompetence: Limitations of the control platform (hard-
ware and operating system) may lead to jitter, i.e., variation of delays in reading
sensor values and writing actuator values. This may lead to violation of the hard
real time constraints of the control law of the computation, i.e., the next steer-
ing value is not available before the next sampling moment. (see also footnote 1
below for more explanation of the problem). There is a number of solutions to
the problem. If the problem is not addressed, the submodels may not be com-
petent. If the chosen solution is not communicated from the control engineer
to the software designer, then there may occur inconsistencies within the DE
submodel.
The robot control law takes into account the calculation time, so the calcula-
tion based on the measurements in the moment k*T, is calculated to be written
into actuators in the (k+1)*T moment in time, which is the next samling time.
Quantization incompetence:
A sensor measuring some quantity gives typically an analog value as result (volt-
age). By quantization, i.e., digitalization of an analog value, the accuracy of the
value decreases (i.e. the accuracy depends on the (size of the) representation).
If the DE model does not cope with this inaccuracy, the DE model will not
be competent. An example may be that we integrate about (inaccurate) speed
to derive the position of an object, which will by "wrong" to the extent of the
inaccuracy of the speed.
Boundary incompetence:
When a quantity to measure is beyond the maximum level of the sensor, then
there are dierent ways how the sensor writes its measurement. One possibility
is that the sensor keeps writing its maximal value. If this maximal value is, e.g.,
misinterpreted as a constant quantity, then this may lead to an incompetent or
inconsistent control, i.e. an incompetent or inconsistent DE model.
System/environment inconsistency:
Often, we do not model a "complete" system, but only a fragment of it (e.g.
when modeling a car, a nuclear power plant, etc.). It has to be well dened
what the borders of the system that we model are, and what assumptions we
have about the environment (e.g. when there are shared resources, about the
availability of these resources, e.g. for the robot: what is friction of the ground,
is the ground at, is there an inclination? e.g. for a automotive system: is the
ECU used available often enough, do the buses used have enough capacity?) Both
sub-models have, of course, to address the identical fragment of the system. This
may be trivial for toy examples, but for real cases it is non-trivial.
Assumption inconsistency:
Assumptions are in most cases implicit. Documenting assumptions are not actu-
ally part of the tool, but should be part of a modelling methodology. Examples
for inconsistent assumptions can, e.g., be found in the previous paragraph on
system/environment inconsistency. In general, assumptions may refer to all parts
of a system and its environment, the plant the control and their surrounding (the
operator, humidity, temperature etc.).
Abstraction inconsistency:
Abstraction is one of the basic techniques of modelling, "leaving away" non-
relevant aspects. It has as a consequence that all models are "wrong", but what
we try to achieve is that we still can deduce some properties of the real system
from the properties of the model. Obviously, if we make dierent abstractions in
the sub-models, the co-model may become inconsistent. As an example we take
here the case where friction and torque are modelled in the CT model of the
robot, where it is possible that under certain circumstances slip occurs (wheels
rotating without the robot moving). A control model on the DE side that has
abstracted away from slip, may interpret the movement of the wheels wrongly
and come to wrong conclusions about speed and position of the robot.
Idealisation inconsistency:
Idealization is similar to abstraction. But, whereas in abstraction we leave some-
thing away, for an idealisation we introduce simplied behaviour. The classical
example is the point mass modelling in physics. In reality, there are no point
masses, but for modelling it is a useful idealisation, that allows for a simpler
mathematical description, and gives satisfactory results. A typical idealisation
in control is that there is no delay in reading, writing or computing. If idealisa-
tions on delay are dierent in submodels, this may lead to inconsistency.
An idealisation typical for control design is idealising the plant as linear. The
plant model is derived from the
rst principles (established laws of physics), or empirically (in black box
modelling process) and it is not entirely accurate. There are two reasons for
having an inaccurate plant model. First, it is sometimes impossible to derive an
accurate plant model. Second, even when this is possible, such a model would
be very complex, too complex to manipulate it and to derive the control. So, a
simplied model is derived, simple enough to manipulate it, but complex enough
to give predictions that are accurate enough.
This does not only enormously simplies the control design, but it also makes
it a lot easire to reason about the system. It would be very hard to understand
the dynamics of a system without
rst focusing to the special case of linear systems. When modelling a system
composed of electrical, hydraulical, mechanical, optical and so on components
that interact with each other, the modeller starts with linear systems, and then,
if necessary, extends the model with non-linear components.
If we would extend our robot to be a part of a network of autonomous robots
that can communicate with each other, there would be a potential danger of
electro-magnetic interference of the vehicles' sensors. The plant may have to be
re-modelled, which as a consequence would need a dierent control laws, which
would again aect the higher control layers modelled on DE side.
Idealisation incompetence:
A typical example from control engineering is a robot that bumps into a wall.
Physically, this is a phenomenon with very fast, but continuous dynamics. Phys-
ically, this is a phenomenon with very fast dynamics. The robots speed and
accelaration during bumping change with a very high frequency. If the details of
this transition from one steady state (before bumping) to the next steady state
(after bumping) are not of interest, bumping into the wall can be represented in
the model in a much simpler way. For example, in hybrid systems community,
it is common to model it as an event that changes the speed and acceleration
values from some value to zero, instantly.
Modelling trick inconsistency:
Tools provide languages to model a system. Typically, these languages are limited
in their expressiveness, and often we have to squeeze a model into the modelling
language of a tool. Experienced users of a tool know \the way how to model for
this tool". A modelling trick describes a dierent behaviour that the "natural"
one, simply because of the expressiveness of the tool. If the modelling trick is
not made explicit to the other domain modeller, an inconsistence co-model may
be the consequence.
In Uppaal, for example, we add additional variables, states or automata just
to be able to formulate logical expressions that check properties of interest. If
we would use the model in combination with another model, it should be made
clear that these additional elements do not represent elements of the system,
even if they look like they do.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
The aim of our framework for communication between the CT and DE modeller
is to help to improve the modelling process. It contains two dierent kinds of
sources of inconsistency and model incompetence. One kind reects the general
dierences between models used in control theory and in computer science. It is
about how timing, quantization, limitations of hardware that implements control
laws, as well as the software.
Another kind of possible sources of conicts between the two models comes
from dierent interpretation of the data exchanged in the contract. In our run-
ning example, the encoder readings are the data that the DE model receives, and
this is further interpreted as the knowledge about the robot movement, position
and so on.
The reason to have a non-formal classication is that not all of this knowledge
can be formalised. Some of these elements can be formalised and become part of
a language, or an ontology or a pattern. But, some of the knowledge will always
stay non-formal. Having these classes should help nd the fomalisable ones and
rene the others into some sort of a checklist or guidelines for modellers.
The categories we talked about are not something unknown to the experts.
Some of these things are known to control engineers and not to software en-
gineers. But each of these groups is deeply settled into their own conceptual
worlds and consequently to their own mathematical frameworks, that seeing the
systems from the perspective of the other discipline is very dicult. Taking a
pragmatic view, until there is a common semantics or a mathematical framework
that covers both worlds, it is useful to have a list of things that one expert needs
to understand from the other expert world.
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Abstract. As autonomous vehicles are increasingly deployed outside
closed environments, safety consideration for their use in outdoor envi-
ronments is of crucial importance. A complete safety case for such sys-
tems covers uncertain perception of the environment, motion planning
within such an environment and finally potential failures in the execu-
tion of the planned behavior. Here, we present a design for safety of an
autonomously operating transport vehicle considering all of these three
aspects thereby providing clear arguments for such a safety case that this
system is acceptably safe to operate on publicly accessible spaces and in
heterogeneous outdoor environments.
1 Introduction
Autonomous vehicles are increasingly used in logistics and factory automation.
With the evolution of navigation capabilities and obstacle avoidance techniques,
they have reached a degree of autonomy that allows their operation beyond
closed work environments accessible to authorized personnel only. In such het-
erogeneous outdoor environments autonomous systems face new challenges, such
as the avoidance of moving obstacles and navigation under changing environ-
ment conditions. Traditionally, automated vehicles are considered as machines
and considerations on functional safety follow mechanical engineering principles,
where the focus is on component failures and the primary goal is to increase the
component reliability. After integrating these components the safety risks of the
system are assessed and if necessary, a stage of risk reduction is performed, e.g.,
by installation of additional safety devices. Those devices are usually certified or
evaluated, such that their failure probability can be estimated. According to EN
1525, a dedicated safety standard for automated guided vehicles, safety devices
on an automated vehicle have to be able to detect test bodies of a certain size
and comply to certain safety categories (EN 954 and ISO 13849). With a higher
speed and dynamic trajectory planning, verifying the safety of an autonomous
vehicle becomes a challenging task. The new standard ISO 26262 for the au-
tomotive sector requires the definition of a safety case that provides evidence
for a system’s safety. For autonomous vehicles, similar requirements in future
standards can be envisioned. Kelly et al. [6] state: “The safety case is the docu-
ment, or set of documents, presenting the argument that a system is acceptably
safe to operate in a given context.” Here, we will present a design for safety for
an autonomous transport vehicle (ATV) together with the corresponding safety
considerations and thereby providing the basis for the necessary arguments of
such a safety case of an ATV following this design.
2 Design for Safety
Fig. 1: Illustration of the
scenario.
We are interested in a logistics application in a sce-
nario in which the autonomous system is equipped
with more sensors (mobile and stationary) than the
traditional automated guided vehicles. The concept
mainly builds on the fact that the sensed area is in-
creased due to the use of multiple sensors and hence
has the potential of driving at higher speeds while still
maintaining a high level of safety illustrated in Fig. 1.
2.1 Architecture
For the ATV we assume a common architecture as illustrated in Fig. 2 as a basis
for the following safety considerations. First, information about the environment
is gathered via on-board and/or external sensors to build up a context model.
This context model is then used to make predictions about future changes in the
environment, other traffic participants in particular. Based on this prediction,
a trajectory is planned to follow a route to a given goal. As the ATV has to
act on incomplete and possibly erroneous information about the environment,
we have to show that such incomplete knowledge in the environment cannot
lead to collisions, i.e., only safe decisions are taken by the ATV. Specifically, we
consider three different sources of partial knowledge (marked as red in Fig. 2):
Context
 Model
Dynamic Model
Sensors
Data Fusion
Route Planner
Trajectory Planner
Actuators/Controller
Control-Accuracy
Measurement
Movement
Prediction
Fig. 2: Architecture of the
autonomous transport vehi-
cle.
1. Measurement uncertainty: Sensor measure-
ments are often subject to noise, which has to
be accounted for in the data fusion process.
Here, we assume that the noise also reflects
the possibility of not detecting objects.
2. Movement uncertainty: Future movement di-
rections of other traffic participants are un-
known to the system and therefore a worst
case has to be considered.
3. The implemented control action from the ac-
tuator might differ from the desired ones such
that planned trajectories might lead to colli-
sions due to these differences. Therefore, this
uncertainty has also to be considered during
trajectory planning to ensure collision avoid-
ance.
In the following argument, we will demonstrate how these non-determinisms can
be treated safely, such that the resulting actions/trajectory can be guaranteed to
be collision-free. At this stage we will neglect technical failures due to individual
components such as the actuators. These have to be analysed separately and can
be dealt with standard methods such as Fault Tree Analysis, see [7].
The overall arguments is as follows: First, we will show, how uncertain sensor
information can be used to obtain an upper bound on the occurrence probability
of an object at a particular position at the current point in time. Second, we will
define a dynamic model, which again gives an upper bound on this occurrence
probability, however at any point in time in the future. Finally we have to show,
how this information can be used to plan a collision free trajectory, which leads
to the desired goal.
2.2 Context model
In this section, we show, how sensor information can be incorporated into an
occupancy map ensuring a safe over-approximation. Specifically, we calculate a
probability of different cells cxy being occupied. Thus Pt(cxy = 1) indicates the
probability that the cell at position xy is occupied at time t, whereas cxy = 0
means that the cell is free. As stated previously, the goal is to compute an upper
bound on this probability based on the information provided by the sensors. As
the probability varies over time, we have to condition on a point in time, for which
the probability is estimated. Technically, we represent the sensor measurement
and dynamic evolution of the objects as a dynamic state model in which the
occupancy grid is the state variable, which evolves over time and from which we
can only make noisy observations. The underlying model is similar to the one
used in [1,5] and can be described by the following two aspects: (1) Definition
of the dynamics, (2) Incorporate sensor information. Each of these steps have to
result in an occupancy grid, which needs to be pessimistic, i.e., is only allowed
to overestimate and must not underestimate the occupancy probability.
System Dynamics. To define the dynamics pessimistically, we define dynamics
by assigning an upper bound on the transition probability P
(
(x′, y′) ∆t→ (x, y)
)
from a cell cx′,y′ to another cell cx,y within the duration ∆t. Depending on the distance
between source and target cell, the bound will decrease to zero. We denote the support
of this transition probability with Rxy.
3 If we start with a given probability map at
time t, we can then calculate the pessimistic update at time t+∆t:
Pt+∆t(cxy) =1−
 ∏
(x′y′)∈Rxy
(
1− Pt(cx′y′)P
(
(x′, y′) ∆t→ (x, y)
))
· (1− Pt(cxy)λxy)
(
1− P sxy
)
≤1−
∏
(x′y′)∈Rxy
(1− Pt(cx′y′)) (1− Pt(cxy)λxy)
(
1− P sxy
) (1)
3 For example a disk with radius given by the maximal allowed velocity
where λxy is a predefined rate with which objects might generate new objects to model
a person leaving a car or a car leaving a garage. P sxy is the probability with which new
objects might spawn at location xy. Both rates are free parameters and have to be set
reasonably. For example the spawning probability might be higher at the border of the
map, where new objects can enter the grid for the first time. For equation (1), we used
the worst case bound by using the trivial bound ≤ 1 on the transition probability. How-
ever, we could also obtain a tighter bound and be more efficient, if we used the trivial
bound on the acceleration instead and thereby bounding the probability distribution
over velocities. Note that, by using this pessimistic dynamical model, probability mass
will be generated, reflecting aging of knowledge and decreasing reliability of occupancy
information in absence of fresh sensory information. This process can, however, be
counterfeited by fresh information in terms of sensor information. As the operation has
to be performed at every time step ∆t, we have to guarantee that it can be carried
out in real time. For this, we note that if we represent equation (1) in the log-domain,
it can be written as a filter operation commonly used in image processing (see also
equation (4)).
Probabilistic Sensor Information. To incorporate the measurements from dif-
ferent sensors, we use a Bayesian approach [1,5]. Many sensors, e.g., laser scanners, do
not directly measure grid-cells and only provide partial information. Specifically, for the
laser scanner, the (uncertain) information about occupied cells must be inferred from
distances to objects along a beam originating from a specific position. To this end, we
first transform the current occupancy grid (given by Pt(cxy)) into a polar occupancy
grid, centered on the laser scanner. As several cells from the original grid might overlap
with a cell in the newly constructed grid Pt(cr,θ), we assign the maximal occupancy
probability of all overlapping cells to this polar-grid cell. To incorporate a measurement
from a laser scanner in the form of a measured distance di along a beam with angle
ψ, we need upper and lower bounds on the likelihood p(d|r, ψ) ≤ p(d|r, ψ) ≤ p(d|r, ψ).
These bounds can be obtained from worst and best case environmental conditions for
the sensor, or by accessing the systematical and statistical error typically given by the
technical specifications of a sensor. To calculate the posterior distribution pt(r|d, ψ) we
first have to calculate the current distribution over distances pt(r|ψ) first which in turn
can easily be calculated from the current occupancy grid Pt(crθ). To obtain an upper
bound on the posterior probability, we exploit the bound:
pt(r|d, ψ) = p(d|r, ψ)pt(r|ψ)∑
r′ p(d|r′, ψ)pt(r′|ψ)
≤ p(d|r, ψ)∑
r′ p(d|r′, ψ)pt(r′|ψ)
(2)
Note that the right hand side can be larger than one, which we can safely reduce
to one. However, the efficiency of such a bound mainly depends on the quality of the
bounds on likelihood p(d|r, ψ) and the lower bound in particular. For the updated
(polar) occupancy grid, we have:
Pt(crψ|d, ψ) = pt(r|ψ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (c|r=r(c))p(r=r(c))
+P (cr,ψi) ·
(∑
s<r
pt(s|di, ψi)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
P (c|r<r(c))p(r<r(c))
(3)
This update can be done for each laser-scan beam individually, as the corresponding
cells do not overlap, i.e., provide independent information. To obtain an occupancy grid
in the Cartesian coordinate system, we use the same over-approximation as before,
that is we assign each cell cxy the maximal probability among the overlapping cells
of equation (3). If information of more than one sensor is to incorporated into the
occupancy grid, we can update the grid sequentially as long as the different sensors are
independent of each other (with respect to their causes of errors).
2.3 Prediction
For the reachability, we can use the same dynamic model as for the pessimistic udpate
in equation (1).
log(1− Pt+τ (cxy)) =
∑
x′,y′∈Rτxy
log (1− Pt(cx′,y′)) + log (1− Pt(cxy)λxy) + const, (4)
where we made the dependency of the reachability region R on the planning horizon
τ explicit. Furthermore, we note, that Pt+τ not only gives a bound on the occurrence
probability at the time-point t + τ , but for the complete period [t, t + τ ], because
of the pessimistic bound on the transition probability. To bound the computational
complexity, the reachability region Rτxy can be computed beforehand (possibly for
different types of dynamic objects) and then equation (4) can be implemented as a
convolution with a fixed kernel which has to be carried out during runtime. Having
calculated this prediction of possibly occupied cells, we can directly evaluate (upper
bound) the collision probability of an ATV at future times by summing all cells the
ATV will cross during a planned trajectory.
2.4 Trajectory Planning
Safety Assessment of Trajectories. As calculated in the previous sections, we
already have a safe upper bound on the occupancy probability for future times and
places as given by the occupancy grid. To assess the safety level of a trajectory (given
by a sequence of acceleration and steering actions), we have to sum all the grid cells
which the ATV will cross during the execution of such a trajectory. At this step, we
have to take inaccuracies of the controller, as indicated in Fig. 2, into account. To do
so, we have to calculate reachability regions due to these inaccuracies using a model of
the car dynamics:
x˙(t) = v(t) cos(θ(t)), y˙(t) = v(t) sin(θ(t)), v˙(t) = u1a, θ˙(t) =
v(t)
L
sin(φmaxu2),
where u1, u2 are angular and longitudinal acceleration actions, a is a friction coefficient,
φmax is the maximal steering angle, and L is the length of the car. v, θ, x, y are velocity,
angular velocity and positions respectively. Using this model, we can calculate the
worst case deviation in x, y position, if we assume inaccuracies in u1, u2. Again, these
regions can be calculated beforehand and only during runtime we have to add these
regions to the planned path to obtain a worst case zone in which the ATV is guaranteed
to be during the execution of the planned action sequences. For an explicit algorithm
to calculate these regions, see [4]. To bound the collision probability of a sequence of
actions, we sum all occurrence probabilities in grid cells covered by the reachability
regions.
Existence of Safe Trajectories. Once we have access to the collision probability
at any point in space and time in the future, we are in the position to validate the
trajectories which correspond to different actions such as acceleration and/or steering
adjustments. For the safety case, we have to show that we can always find a combination
of actions such that the collision probability is smaller than a given threshold. The
argument for the existence is analogue to the concept of a safety zone [2]. The sketch
of the argument is the following. Initially, we can assume that we have found such a
trajectory at the last execution of the planner module (We can assume to start our
mission from a safe position with zero velocity, hence the action ’no acceleration’ is
always safe). Second, we assume, that the time between two execution steps of the
planner module is smaller than a given threshold h. Let tmax stop be the time duration
needed for the ATV to achieve a full stop starting from maximal velocity, which defines
the safety zone. We assume to have found a trajectory in the last execution step, which
is safe for the next tmax stop + h time units for a sequence of steering and acceleration
actions. As the trajectory from the last step is safe under pessimistic assumptions, it
will be safe for the next tmax stop time units. Hence, we always have the possibility to
brake and will stop within these tmax stop units. In [2] a more detailed discussion as
well as a formal argument on these real-time constraints for the safety zone can be
found. However, we can also choose another action/steering combination, given the
safety level as computed in the previous section is acceptable. If we cannot find such a
trajectory in time, we have to fall back to the emergency braking maneuver.
Efficiency Considerations. Although the argument above shows, that we can
always find a safe trajectory, the procedure is not necessarily efficient. Specifically, as
we cannot probe all possible trajectories and evaluate their safety level, we need an
efficient procedure to explore the action space. As the focus is on the safety aspects,
we do not go into details on how to explore the action space. In general, there are
two ways to tackle this efficiency task. On the one hand, one can evaluate the risk
associated with a specific action directly during the trajectory generation. Schro¨der
et al. [8] use a modified A?-Algorithm to generate paths for an autonomous vehicle
from path primitives. Their use of a risk map allows the search algorithm to penalize
vehicle states which lie in cells with a high associated risk, and thereby directing the
search away from critical zones. Although they used this technique for the generation
of paths, it can also be used for the generation of actual action sequences, if penalties
are introduced. If the above quantification of the safety level is used as risk measure
and no trajectory is selected which exceeds the predefined threshold, the corresponding
safety level is automatically guaranteed without any further evaluation. On the other
hand, one can postpone the risk evaluation completely and only consider possible action
sequences during the generation of trajectories [3]. Although a subsequent assessment
of the safety level is necessary in order to guarantee a bounded collision probability, it
has the advantage of possibly fewer risk evaluations and therefore has the potential of
being more efficient.
3 Conclusion
We have presented a design for autonomous transport vehicles together with the nec-
essary safety considerations needed for a complete safety case. The subsequent verifi-
cation, as required in the safety case, thus can follow a decomposition approach, as the
design facilitates a separation into several safety subtasks. For each subtask we have
shown that the corresponding processing step computes safe over-approximations of
risk incurred or justifies its action selections w.r.t. such, i.e., bounds the collision prob-
ability from above. For this upper bound of collision probability to be valid, we have
made several assumptions. First, we assumed an initial probability grid. Although the
initial probability map has to be given the probability of a cell being occupied increases
exponentially fast over time to 1, if the cell is not measured by any sensor. Second, we
have assumed that we have access on bounds for the reliability of the sensors. Finally,
the presented safety concept is only valid, provided the processing steps can be per-
formed within a guaranteed duration, finding a suitable trajectory in particular. The
timely execution of the processing step has to be verified in a subsequent analysis step.
However, as most of the operations needed for the safety considerations here (kernel
filtering, evaluation of different trajectories w.r.t. collision probability) scale linearly
and can be parallelized, such real time constraints mainly depend on the hardware
used.
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The Co-Simulation of a Cardiac Pacemaker using VDM
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Abstract. Collaborative modelling and analysis are essential for the effective de-
sign of trusted cyber-physical systems, including those used in medical applica-
tions. We describe the co-modelling and co-simulation of discrete-event descrip-
tions in the Vienna Development Method (VDM), with continuous-time descrip-
tions in 20-sim. We present a co-model of the McMaster-Boston Scientific car-
diac pacemaker problem linking a VDM model of a cardiac pacemaker controller
combined with a 20-sim model of heart electrophysiology. This is augmented
with descriptions of potential heart failures, allowing the level of correction de-
livered by the pacemaker controller to be assessed.
Keywords: Cyber-physical systems, model-based formal methods, simulation
1 Introduction
In order to gain confidence in the trustworthiness of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), it
is necessary to combine heterogeneous models in a disciplined way. For example, ICT
and software engineers who naturally use rich discrete-event (DE) models must collab-
orate with engineers who use continuous-time (CT) techniques suited to the description
of the controlled plant and environment. The goal of our work is to facilitate collabo-
rative modelling and simulation, in which engineers to work in the most expressive for
the cyber and physical elements of the particular problem, allowing trade-offs across
the DE/CT divide. The DESTECS project1 has developed a framework for collabora-
tive designs (called co-models) composed of models of DE (typically loop and super-
visory controller) and CT (typically plant/environment) elements expressed in different
formalisms. Reconciled operational semantics for the two formalisms allows the con-
stituent models to run in their own simulators, while a co-simulation engine manages the
synchronisation of time and data between them under the control of an external script
that can represent environment or user choices. We have developed methods for the
construction of co-models [1], patterns for fault tolerance co-modelling [2] and support
for design space exploration by multiple co-simulation and ranking of co-models [3].
The approach and tools are being validated in industry on applications including trans-
portation, heavy machinery and high-speed paper processing.
Medical applications are an important domain for CPS technology. In order to pro-
vide a common basis for evaluating emerging methods and tools, McMaster University
1 http://www.destecs.org
and Boston Scientific released a natural language specification for a previous generation
artificial cardiac pacemaker2, inspiring several studies on the use of formal DE-only
modelling [4–7]. However, it is appropriate to consider co-modelling in this context,
since confidence in such a medical CPS requires models of diverse aspects such as
software, electrophysiology and even fluid flow. This paper reports the first attempt to
apply co-modelling to the pacemaker, and the first application of DESTECS technology
(Section 2) in the medical devices domain. Our objective has been to build a proof-of-
concept co-model composed of an abstract CT model of heart electrophysiology in 20-
sim and a VDM model of a pacemaker controller (Section 3). We model known heart
faults in the CT-side model and demonstrate through co-simulation how the pacemaker
design provides resilience to these (Section 4). We draw initial conclusions and suggest
future work in Section 5.
2 Collaborative Modelling and Co-simulation
A co-model consists of a DE model of a controller and a CT model of the plant, with
a contract describing controlled and monitored variables, named events (raised in the
CT model and handled by the DE model), and shared design parameters. During co-
simulation, user and environmental interactions are governed by a script. We use the Vi-
enna Development Method (VDM) formalism for DE-side, and bond graphs for CT-side
modelling. VDM is a a rich language with features for modelling object-orientation and
concurrency [8], and real-time distributed embedded systems [9]. VDM models define
state variables over abstract data types, and functionality via state-changing operations.
VDM simulation is supported by the Overture tool3. CT models are built, simulated
and visualised using the 20-sim4 tool [10]. It allows the dynamics of the plant to be
modelled in several ways, including signal type connections between equation blocks,
and the powerful domain-independent bond graph [11] notation.
Previous work in embedded systems design, such as BODERC [12] and Model-
ica [13] provides modelling environments and libraries for simulating physical and
computing components. Approaches to DE/CT co-simulation are defined by Nicolescu
et al. [14], and there are several co-simulation architectures including Cosimate5 and
HLA [15]. Ptolemy II [16] offers DE and CT simulation within a single tool, though
lacking the object-orientation offered by VDM and the component libraries offered by
20-sim. Work on time synchronisation between DE and CT models is described in hy-
brid systems literature, e.g. [17]. The DESTECS approach is distinctive in including a
rich but abstract DE-side modelling language, and in managing co-simulation of het-
erogeneous models in their “native” tools.
2 http://sqrl.mcmaster.ca/pacemaker.htm
3 http://www.overturetool.org
4 http://www.20sim.com
5 http://www.chiastek.com
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SA Charge
AV Charge
SA Pacing 
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Fig. 1: The co-model contract showing the data exchanged between the models.
3 Heart and Pacemaker Co-model
To pump blood around the body the heart must rhythmically contract and relax its upper
and lower chambers (atria and ventricles respectively). The atria contract first pump-
ing blood into the ventricles which contract shortly afterwards, pumping blood around
the lungs and the rest of the body. The contraction timing is controlled by a pair of
electro-chemical nodes, the Sinoatrial Node (SA node) and the Atrioventricular Node
(AV node). An electrical discharge from the SA node causes a contraction of the atria
and, after a short delay while traversing an internodal pathway, leads to a discharge of
the AV which causes contraction of the ventricles. When the system of natural regula-
tion of heartbeat is impaired, an artificial pacemaker may be used (we will use the term
“pacemaker” to refer to the artificial device unless stated otherwise). Pacemakers may
have one or two electrodes and can be configured for the individual patient. The elec-
trodes can both sense and stimulate the heart. By sensing the heart, the pacemaker can
detect when natural stimulation has occurred so as not to interrupt a healthy intrinsic
cycle. When natural nodal activity is inadequate, the pacemaker delivers an electrical
charge to the heart to stimulate muscle contraction.
The purpose of our co-model is to enable exploration of the effects of pacemaker
designs on the heart’s electrical activity. Our co-model therefore consists of a VDM
model of the pacemaker and a 20-sim model of heart electrophysiology as this reflects
the cyber and physical characters of these two elements (but this is not the only way to
structure the co-model - see Section 5). To support simulation in the DESTECS tools,
these models are connected by a contract which effectively models each of the two
electrodes using a monitored variable (SA/AV Charge) and controlled variable (SA/AV
Pacing) pair, Fig. 1. This allows the pacemaker to monitor the electrical discharges
within the heart and also administer electrical stimulation via the controlled variables.
Heart Model
Fig. 2 shows the CT model of heart electrophysiology. It contains four distinct areas.
The SA and AV nodes have a similar structure in which an integration block represents
the store of electrical charge. The integration blocks receive a steady rate of charge,
sufficient to give each node its intrinsic rhythm. Each node also contains a discharge
condition block which contains the logic controlling when the node discharges and, in
the SA node, passes charge to the next node. The feedback path in each node facili-
tates discharging of the integration block. There is also an area representing the intern-
odal pathway, through which charge passes from the SA to the AV node. The artificial
pacemaker block, instead of containing a CT representation of the (cyber) controller,
contains the co-model interface used to link to the DE model via the contract.
Fig. 2: CT model of the heart
S1: Waiting for atrial contraction
S2: Waiting for ventricular contraction
S3: Delivering atrial stimulation
S4: Delivering ventricular stimulation
a: Intrinsic atrial contraction
b: Atrial timeout
c: Atrial stimulation complete
d: Intrinsic ventricular contraction
e: Ventrical timeout
f: Ventricular stimulation complete
ec
a d
b fS1
S2
S3 S4
Fig. 3: Finite state machine showing the gross behaviour of the pacemaker.
We model two cardiac arrhythmias as faults in the CT model. In sinus bradycardia
the SA node discharges less frequently than required, leading to a slow heartbeat. When
activated, this fault is modelled by reducing the value of the primary rate in the SB Fault
block. Third degree AV block prohibits transmission of charge from the SA node to the
AV node and is modelled by the AV Block fault when activated.
Pacemaker Model
The DE pacemaker model monitors the discharges of both heart nodes and stimulates ei-
ther node as necessary. Under normal conditions the controller alternates between wait-
ing for intrinsic atrial discharge and waiting for intrinsic ventricular discharge (Fig. 3).
These discharges are detected by monitoring shared node charge values and looking for
a sharp negative gradient (see Detect Ventricular Maxima operation in Fig. 4).
In the event that an expected discharge does not occur the pacemaker administers stim-
ulation to the appropriate node via a non zero value on its pacing lead (Stimulate V
operation in Fig. 4), thus compensating for the faulty behaviour.
4 Co-Simulation Results
Co-simulation of the pacemaker and heart models in the DESTECS tool yields results
presented in Fig. 5 as a graph (generated by 20-sim) of atrial and ventricular node activ-
ity in the heart model, where pacemaker interaction can be seen by its effects on these
outputs. Figs. 5(a) and 5(b) compare a typical ECG for a healthy heart with the output

public Perform_Control_Step : () ==> ()
Perform_Control_Step() ==
( if settings.V_Sensed() then
( if data.V_contraction.Timeout() and settings.V_Paced()
then Stimulate_V();
...
);
private Detect_Ventricular_Maxima: () ==> bool
Detect_Ventricular_Maxima() ==
( dcl previous_v :real := data.prev_ventricular_value;
dcl previous_d :real := data.prev_ventricular_delta;
dcl value : real := V_in.GetValue();
dcl delta : real := value - previous_v;
data.prev_ventricular_value := value;
data.prev_ventricular_delta := delta;
return(previous_d >= 0 and delta < 0);
);
public Stimulate_V: () ==> ()
Stimulate_V() ==
( V_out.Fire(1500);
data.pacing_timer.Reset();
); 
Fig. 4: Extracts of operations in the VDM controller model.
from the co-model. Atrial contraction commences at (A) and ventricular contraction at
(B). The interval between atrial and ventricular contraction (C) is regular, and the inter-
val between successive heartbeats (D) is regular and within the bounds of 60-100 BPM.
Point RP in Figure 5(a) is indicative of cells recharging, but is ignored by the model
which focuses only the discharges monitored by the pacemaker.
The effects of fault introduction can be seen in Fig. 5(c), where the output represents
a heart with symptoms of AV block. Here the output shows no synchronisation between
atrial and ventricular contraction. Fig. 5(d) shows the pacemaker interacting with the
heart at points P, where spikes show the presence of artificial stimulation. This stimula-
tion restores synchronisation between contractions, and provides a healthy rhythm.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We have briefly introduced the DESTECS approach to co-modelling and co-simulation
and presented our first co-model of the pacemaker controller. We believe that this is
the first attempt at a formal co-model of the McMaster/Boston Scientific pacemaker.
A BC D
RP
B
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5: Normal heart as a typical ECG (a) and CT model output (b). Simulated heart
block ECG without pacing (c) and with pacing (d).
The process of co-model construction is interesting. In order to build a first model of
the controller, we began with a rough DE approximation of the heart electrophysiology
which was later replaced with the CT model. This “DE-first” approach [1] is one of
several methods. For example, a CT-first approach stresses the physics from the outset,
eventually replacing controller blocks with richer descriptions in DE formalisms.
The placement of the DE/CT boundary is significant and is governed by the purpose
for which the co-model is constructed. In our co-model, the contract models the con-
trolled plant (the leads), and the heart is the environment. If we wanted to focus more
signal propagation in the leads themselves, it might be appropriate to model them in
greater detail and move them to the CT side.
The fidelity of our initial co-model might be improved. We would like to better rep-
resent the charging behaviour of the nodes. The ECG output may be good enough for
some analytic purposes but we would like to move from a square wave to curves and
spikes, with pulse heights that better represent real values such as in [18]. We plan to
model more realistic beat timing variation, and to model more heart blocks including
slow conduction and partial loss of electrical charge, tachycardias and junctional ar-
rhythmias. Our DE model is less comprehensive than the existing “DE-only” models
in its coverage of pacing modes and rate modulation, but could be readily extended.
Overall, although our co-model is still preliminary, we believe that it forms a useful
step towards co-modelling of medical cyber-physical systems.
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Abstract. We propose a semantic model named timed-pNets to define
hierarchical structures for CPSs as well as its communication behaviors
semantic with time constraints. Logical clocks relations are introduced
to describe the partial order of event occurring. After setting (time)-
boundaries and designing properties, we use the TimeSquare tool to
simulate the system and check its properties.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, cyber physical systems have received much attention since the next
generation of computing revolution is integration of computation, control and
communication [7]. In CPSs, heterogenous embedded devices are connected by
wire or wireless networks to communicate among each other via sets of sensors
and actuators. One typical application domain is intelligent transportation sys-
tems (ITS), in which cars and infrastructures are equipped with sensors and
actuators. They communicate with each other to update physical information
and accomplish remote controlling. Currently, Research and Innovative Tech-
nology Administration (RITA)[10] in U.S. Department of Transportation has
started research work on it to achieve a vision of national transportation by
feature a connected transportation environment among vehicles, infrastructures
and passengers’ portable devices. They raised the importance of real-time com-
munication among these distributed nodes since the data out of date would make
big mistakes even sometime could lead to car accidence. For example, the delay
of sending global traffic information to cars may result to a wrong guiding for
car to choose its best way. Also the delay of information exchanging among cars
may cause a car accidence especially when they cannot see each other at cross.
Our aim is to build a low-level semantic model for the system and then anal-
yse its properties. Since each distributed device has its own clock(s) and the com-
munication delay between devices is uncertain, synchronous and asynchronous
communication behavior will be considered in our model. We propose timed-
pNets, which is an extension of pNets [2], to describe the communication behav-
ior by adding logic clock relation. Time-pNets absorbs many advantages of pNets
? This work was partialy funded by the Associated Team DAESD between IN-
RIA and ECNU, Shanghai; by ECNU for overside visiting funding, China 973
project(No.2011CB302802) and NSFC(No.610211004).
such as well hierarchical structure, flexible communication models, compact for-
mat, expressiveness, etc. By introducing clock relations which is defined in CCSL
[8], the asynchronous communication behavior can be well defined which leads
to well checking for real-time properties. Finaly, we use the TimeSquare tool to
simulate the clock relation of models and then check the correction of time logic
as well as properties.
The main contributions of our work in the paper include: 1) Introduce logical
clocks into pNets, 2) Propose a model language timed-pNets , 3) Use timed-
pNets to model ITS, 4) Use TimeSquare to simulate clock relations and check
its properties.
In section 2 we introduce the related work. In section 3 we give the definition
of timed-pNets. In section 4, we propose a simple use case and describe how we
use timed-pNets to model it. In section 5, we use time square to simulate the
clock relations of the system and check its properties. In the last section, we give
an conclusion for our current work.
2 Related Work
Prior research works related to building model for ITS applications include:
– Timed-automata[1] can be used to model the behavior of real-time systems.
They provide a simple, and yet powerful, way to annotate state-transition
graphs with timing constraints using finitely many real-valued clocks. Clo-
sure properties, decision problems as well as automatic verification of real-
time requirements of finite-state systems are considered in timed-automata,
and are supported by a number of tools, e.g. in UPPAAL [4].
– Globally Asynchronous Locally Synchronous (GALS) systems [9] combine
the benefits of synchronous and asynchronous systems, in which each em-
bedded node is modeled as a FSM (Finite State Machine) and the commu-
nication between them as buffers. This architecture provides a methodology
for combining concurrent embedded systems within loosely coupled systems.
– The BIP framework [3], which can be used to model heterogeneous real-time
components. BIP provides a powerful mechanism for structuring interaction
for layered components of which synchronous and time systems are particular
classes. The BIP framework produces a very fine grained formal computa-
tional model of the system functional level and executes the model semantics
at runtine. In parallel, recent evolutions of the BIP framework allow the use
of timed models and provide a real-time BIP Engine.
– Spatio-temporal consistence language(STeC) [5], which provides a location-
triggered specification as well as operational semantics for describing dis-
tributed system with time and location constraints.
Compared to these previous works, our appraoch uses logical clocks instead
of physical clocks, so that our approach is flexible enough to describe a commu-
nication delay by clock relation rather than by concrete time units. This gives
us a very flexible way to specify interaction of systems with different clocks.
3 Timed-pNets
In this section, we define Timed-pNets, which are an extension of pNets (pa-
rameterized networks of synchronized automata), a very expressive and flexible
semantic model developped by the Oasis team at INRIA for the modeling and
verification of (untimed) distributed systems [2].
Definition 1 (Timed-Actions). Let T be a set of discrete time variables tak-
en from non-negative natural numbers N. BT is the set of boolean expressions
(guards) over time variables and LA,T is an action set built over T , in which
each action has a free time variable t ∈ T . We call at|B ∈ LA,T , with B ∈ BT a
timed action, in which t describes a time delay before the action can be executed.
We set a0 = a that means the action a is always ready. As an example, at|1≤t≤3
means the action a cannot be executed until t units times are passed.
Logical Clocks of timed-Actions Logical clocks [8] represent a relaxed form
of time where any events can be taken as a reference for counting. It can be used
for specifying classical and multiform real-time requirements as well as formally
specifying constraints on the behavior of a model.
Definition 2 (Logic Clocks). A clock Ca consists of an infinite set of discrete
ticks of timed-action at. We write Ca = {(at) 1, (at) 2, ..., (at) k, ...}(k ∈ N, at ∈
LA,T ), in which (at) k denotes the kth instance of clock Ca.
Clock Constraints Clock constraints are predicates built from binary relations
between clock expressions. We take the syntax and semantics of clock relations
from [8], which is a language to express multi-clock time specifications by defin-
ing clock relations of time models for real-time systems. The clock relations
include: ⊆ (subclock), ] (exclusion), = (coincidence), ≺ (strict precedence),(
precedence) and defined as:
– a1 ⊆ a2 (a1 is a subclock of a2), which means each instance of a1 must be
coincident with an instant of a2.
– a1]a2 (a1 excludes a2), which means none of their instances coincide.
– a1 = a2 (a1 coincides with a2), which means the action a1 ticks if and only
if the action a2 ticks.
– a1 ≺ a2 (a1 strictly precedes a2), which means for every instant k (k ∈ N),
the kth instant of a1 strictly precedes the k
th instant of a2.
– a1  a2 (a1 precedes a2), which similar to the previous one. The only differ-
ent is the action a1 can tick as late as when a2 ticks.
– New relations or expressions can be define by combining these basic relations
with arithmetic and boolean. For example: a1 − a2 ≺ a3
The next definition extends the classical pNets definition from [2] with timed-
actions and clock constraints. From pNets, we retain the hierarchical structure
that is essential in structuring our heterogeous systems, but also the parame-
terization of subnets: holes in a pNet can be instanciated by a variable number
of subnets (as e.g. a number of cars in the forthcoming case-study). Then syn-
chronisation vectors allow very flexible and expressive multi-way synchronisation
mechanisms, that naturally we extend here with clock constraints.
Definition 3 (Timed-pNets). A Timed-pNet is a tuple < P,AG, RG, J, C, O˜J , R˜J ,
−→
V >,
where:
– P = {pi/pi ∈ Domi} is a finite set of parameters
– AG ⊆ LA,T is a set of global actions
– C is a set of clocks for all actions
– RG is a set of relations between actions taken from each subnet
– J is a countable set of argument indexes: each index j ∈ J is called a hole
and is associated with a sort Oj ⊆ LA,T and a set of clock constraints R˜J
–
−→
V = {−→v } is a set of synchronous vectors of the form:
* (binary communication) −→v =< ..., !at1[ki1], ..., ?at2[ki2], ... >→ (a
tg
g ), in which
a
tg
g ∈ AG, ki1 ∈ Dom1, ki2 ∈ Dom2, !at1 ∈ Oi1, ?at2 ∈ Oi2, tg = max{t1, t2}
* or (visibility) −→v =< ..., at1[k1], ... >→ (atgg ), in which atgg ∈ AG, k1 ∈ Dom1, at1 ∈
Oi1, tg = t1
4 Case Study
In this part we illustrate our approach with a simple use case called speed con-
trolling system taken from [10]. Here cars’ speed are monitored by infrastructure
that collects information from cars and sends brake signal back to cars under
some global decision procedure. The communication protocol is described as
following:
– Cars send heartbeat signals ”I’m here” with parameters ”(location, speed)”.
– Infrastructure collects heartbeat signals from cars.
– Infrastructure sends ”brake” signal to the car if it is over the speed limitation.
– A car reduces its speed when it gets the ”brake” signal.
Fig. 1 presents its architecture in which cars and infrastructures are distribut-
ed nodes. A cars consists of three sub components: a sensor, a controller and a
brake system. The car sensor is used to detect its current location and speed
and to receive control signals received from the infrastructure. The Car con-
troller gets signals from the sensor and then call the relevant systems to execute
brake operations. The local communications between the sub components of cars
are synchronized, which means that the sending event and receiving event coin-
cide. These sub components’ LTS are shown in Fig. 1. The car sensor is modeled
by two LTSs: one defining the periodical sending of heartbeat signals to report
its location and speed, the other describing its reactions to control signals.
Now, we describe how to use timed-pNets to model the communication be-
havior and how to build clock relations in and between components. By lack of
space we only explain the top-level synchronisation elements, and the behaviour
of the car’s subprocesses.
Fig. 1. Timed-pNets architecture with details of the car’s subprocesses
4.1 Formalisation of timed-pNets Architecture
The building of timed-pNets is hierarchical. For our exemple, we generate sep-
arately a pNet structure for the toplevel assembly, and for each of the Car and
Infrastructure components. The top-level pNet has 2 holes, the first one receiv-
ing an arbitrary number of Cars, the second one a single Infrastructure. Within
each “second layer” pNet local communications will be synchronous, while at
toplevel communications are asynchronous. This shows in the following pNet,
where clock relations on the ”hb” and “ctrl” links are defined as precedence.
< P = {k : N}, AG, RG, J, C˜J , O˜J , R˜J ,−→V >
AG = {CI hbth(k, loc, speed), CI ctrltct(k, brake)}
J = {car[k], infrastructure}
OCar = {!c hbthb c(loc, speed), ?c ctrltct c(brake), !call(brake), Ts, ...}
OInfrastructure = {?I hbthb I (k, loc, speed), !I ctrltct I (k, brake), ...}
RG = {!c hbthb c [k](loc, speed) ≺?I hbthb I [k](loc, speed);
............!I ctrltct I (k, brake) ≺?c ctrltct c [k](brake);}−→
V :< Ocar[k], Oinfrastrcuture >→ ACar infrastrcuture
... =<!c hbthb c [k](loc, speed), ?I hbthb I [k](loc, speed) >→ CI hbth(k, loc, speed);
...... <?c ctrltct c [k](brake), !I ctrltct I (k, brake) >→ CI ctrltct(k, brake).}
An interesting point is that the Infrastructure receives independent heart-
beats for the Cars, that are subsequently interleaved within the Infrastructure
structure. This is expressed by a clock relation on the link between Infrastruc-
ture sensors and control: ?I hbthb I [k](loc, speed) ⊆!hbtII (k, loc, speed), telling the
each Car heartbeat clock transmitted by the Sensor is a subset of the (single)
heartbeat clock received by the Control.
Finally, we give an example of the set of Clock constraints that we generate
from a pLTS, here for the Car Sensor sub component:
RCarSensor = {hb(loc, speed) , idealClockdiscretizedByrate (1);
........................(τ]!ctrl(brake)) (2);
........................?c ctrl(result) ≺ (τ∧!ctrl(brake)) (3);
........................!ctrl(brake) ≺?T s (4);
........................(?T s[i] ∨ τ [i]) ≺?c ctrl(result)[i+ 1] (5);}
where (1) describes that the heartbeat signal is sent periodically; (2) indi-
cates that events τ and !ctrl(brake), from different paths of the same LTS, are
exclusive; (3) denotes that the event ?c ctrl(result) always precedes the event τ
and !ctrl(brake); (4) tells us that event !ctrl(brake) precedes the event ?T s; (5)
explains that the events in the ith cycle precedes those in the (i+ 1)th cycle.
5 Simulation
We use TimeSquare [6] to simulate the clock relations and check its logic correc-
tion. The input of TimeSquare is a CCSL file including clock relations, bound
requirements and properties. The tool proceeds with a symbolic simulation, and
generates a trace model (one partial order satisfying the specification). Output
files (text and graph) are generated to display the traces and eventually show
the property violations.
In our use-case the clock relations generated from the pNets model. Then we
representing the communication and computation delays by fixing delay bound
in timed-action guards. We set heartbeat interval hi = hb (i+ 1) − hb i. The
minimum and maximum communication delay between car and infrastructure
is set as (1/5)hi and (3/5)hi. For the computation delay, we assume that it
takes at most (2/5)hi for each action transition so that for instance we can
set (?c ctrl(result)−?T s)  (2/5)hi. For deadline, assuming each heartbeat
signal should be processed before sending next heartbeat, then for each action
a i, we set deadline = hb (i+ 1). All these boundaries are merged into the
TimeSquare CCSL input file. We expressed a “boundary liveness property” for
this simulation to see if the system satisfies the real-time property under the
hypothesis of boundaries. (?T s (i) ≺ hb (i+ 1)) ∧ (τ i ≺ hb (i+ 1)) denotes
each heartbeat signal finally will be processed before deadline.
After simulation, we got the result as Fig.2, which shows that the real-time
property is not satisfied since the clock !ctrl(brake) is over the deadline. The
boundary condition we set in previous part was too large. After we modify the
maximum computation boundary, the simulation shows no more violations.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have added time constraints to the pNets behavior seman-
tic model. In timed-pNets, logical time relations in lower-level (synchronous)
components are derived from the corresponding label transition systems. Then
Fig. 2. property checking
communication delays, processing delays and required global properties are de-
fined by the user. We illustrate our approach on a simple use case from Intelligent
Transport Systems, show how our Timed-pNets models are constructed, and how
timed properties are validated through simulations in the TimeSquare tool.
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Abstract. The development of next-generation neural prosthetics will
see closed-loop interactions form between computational elements and
biological systems, with the aim of restoring or repairing standard be-
haviour functionality. This cyber-physical connection places a huge amount
of trust into the computation, due to the catastrophic consequences of
potential failures. This paper discusses the progression of these prosthetic
devices and highlights potential causes for discussion when considering
the trustworthiness of the system.
1 Neural Prosthetics
Brain-machine interfaces (BMI) involve the coupling of electronic components
to an animal’s nervous system, typically with the objective of either recording
activity or stimulating the nerves.
Monitoring nerve activity allows for investigations into the behaviour of bi-
ological systems and has led to some great leaps forward in our understanding
of the function of the nervous system and brain. The stimulation of biological
tissue started with similar investigatory goals, but it has progressed to allow the
development of medical neural prosthetic devices. These devices offer potential
treatment for previously incurable disease and ailments, such as deafness [1],
blindness [2] and tetraplegia [3].
In recent years we have seen the advancement of BMI technology, whereby
the coupling between machine and body is greater than ever before and the
interaction is becoming a closed-loop system. More often we are seeing the func-
tionality of the nerve stimulation systems rely upon the recorded neural activity.
For instance, the neural prosthetic device for tetraplegia described by Moritz et
al. relies upon neuron activity in the motor cortex to control stimulation of the
patient’s arm muscles [4]. Also, in 2011 we saw a brain-machine-brain interface
developed by O’Doherty et al [5]. This involved not only a robotic arm controlled
via a primate’s motor cortex, but also a sensory feedback signal being delivered
back into the brain of the animal, which changed depending upon the movement
of robotic arm.
The next-step in this technological arena could be to develop cognitive pros-
thetic devices whereby, damaged individual neuron cells, or even large brain
regions are substituted by silicon neurons, in order to overcome conditions such
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as stroke or epilepsy. By connecting bio-realistic neuron models to the damaged
brain tissue it may be possible to restore, repair or replace the damaged nerve
cells to regain functionality [6], an example of a such a next-generation neural
prosthetic is shown in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. An example of a next-generation cellular neural prosthetic. A closed-loop in-
teraction is formed between the biological nerve cells and the silicon neuron model
through various interface techniques.
The behaviour of some neural circuits relies upon the presence of a pacemaker
cell, acting much like a clock within a silicon system. If the pacemaker is damaged
and becomes inactive or faulty, the neural circuit may also cease to function. By
modelling the damaged cell and interfacing with the biology, the behaviour may
be restored.
We have demonstrated this concept in practice with real nerve tissue dis-
sected from a crab. Fig. 2 shows the results of this experiment. First of all, the
original circuit is intact and functioning correctly. Then, when two of the cells
are anaesthetized the behaviour dramatically alters. By reintroducing two sili-
con nerve cells, including the pacemaker cell, the network functionality can be
restored.
Fig. 2. An example of a next-generation cellular neural prosthetic. A closed-loop in-
teraction is formed between the biological nerve cells and the silicon neuron model
through various interface techniques.
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By extending this concept of cellular rehabilitation to large-scale systems,
complex cognitive behavioural prosthetics may be introduced, perhaps allowing
for treatment for memory or speech defects.
Recently such a cognitive prosthetic device has been demonstrated in prac-
tice in live mice by Liu et al [7]. Within this experiment a mouse was taught to
fear a particular scenario. When this scenario occurred the mouse instinctively
froze and became aware of danger. Liu et al. showed how by optical stimulating
the same neurons in the hippocampus that were involved in the initial mem-
ory formation the mouse once again froze and became wary. This proved how
targeted stimulation of a select group of neurons is able to influence cognitive
behaviour.
2 Trust in Neural Prosthetics
It is clear that although the potential for application is enormous, there are se-
rious hurdles to overcome in order to make such systems dependable and secure
and hence, trustworthy. The amplitude of these hurdles are magnified by the re-
quirements of the application and the general behaviour of neural systems, which
due to their nature, are inherently noisy, undefined and occasionally erratic.
For a BMI system to be trustworthy there is a dependence upon the machine
to provide the correct service to the brain system. Hence, we may judge the
machine by its ability to satisfy the criteria and definition of dependence [8]:
Availability - A silicon neural model must be ready to operate in the time
window that the biology expects. This requires that all neural models must run
in real-time under all operating conditions. This perhaps may be a challenge for
a neural network which is susceptible to bursting, whereby a rapid pattern of
activity may cause a high computational and communicational load.
Reliability - The machine must provide continued service with extremely,
preferably zero, failure rates. Two major challenges exist here: 1) the wide range
of possible neural input and 2) from an engineering point of view the interface
must be able to operate in the long-term without degradation in performance,
such as that caused by build-up of glia surrounding electrodes.
Safety - Not only must neural prosthetic devices stay within human-tolerable
operating conditions, such as current and temperature limits, but there must be
guarantees that what is perceived as regular neural stimulus does not cause
catastrophic changes in neural circuit activity. Perhaps, in order to guarantee
integrity the machine components of a BMI must be aware of its in influence
upon the service of the biology, and be able to refrain from stimulus that causes
unwanted behaviour.
Integrity - Cognitive prosthetics offer the potential to restore behaviour and
functionality to brain circuit, but they also invite the opportunity for unwanted
outside influences to alter circuit behaviour, with potentially catastrophic dam-
age. BMI systems must be impenetrable to unauthorized accesses and system
design errors.
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Maintainability - This may be a particular challenge for implanted devices,
whereby change or alteration could require surgery to the patient. Therefore,
ideally devices should be externally programmable or reconfigurable such that
authorized alterations may be made without severely impacting upon the user
or patient.
Confidentiality - Cognitive behaviour in animals is encoded within the neural
activity patterns. How can we prevent too much information about this activity
from being read and decoded by unwanted external factors, who perhaps may
have perverse motives.
Although, it is imperative that the machine aspect of a BMI be trustworthy
and dependable, there can be no guarantees that the biological elements will
fulfil their obligations with regards to the metrics described above. The service
provided by the biology may not always be what the silicon expects.
For instance, a consistent stimulus from the machine may have wildly dif-
ferent biological responses due to the natural plasticity and learning processes
within brain circuits. Hence, this makes the requirements on the silicon compo-
nents even greater, as they must satisfy their obligation to be trustworthy and
dependable in a wide-regime of behaviours and dynamics.
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